



ISCA 2024





The Maya Cache

A Storage-efficient and Secure
Fully-associative Last-level Cache

Anubhav Bhatla, Navneet, Biswabandan Panda



CASPER@Indian Institute of Technology Bombay

Background




Cache hierarchy in modern processors

Conflict-based Attacks




A cache miss results a timing difference in access due to high DRAM latency




How to defend?

Randomized mapping





CEASER [MICRO '18]

Skews



**CEASER-S [ISCA '19]
SCATTER CACHE [S&P '19]**






How to defend?

Randomized mapping




Skews




SAEs make eviction set discovery possible

CEASER [MICRO '18]

CEASER S [ISCA '19]
SCATTER CACHE [S&P '19]






How to defend?

Randomized mapping



Skews



SAE recovery possible

So, what's the FIX ??

USER 5 [ISCA '19]
USER CACHE [S&P '19]

2021



2019

Broken using
probabilistic evictions
[S&P'21]



discovery
accesses
[ISCA'19], [S&P'19]




Fully Associative Randomized Cache



Fully Associative Randomized Cache




Fully associative
randomized LLC with
random global eviction





Evicted Block

No set-associative evictions; makes it harder for conflict-based attacks




Fully Associative Randomized Cache



Fully associative caches improve security but at the cost of power and latency

Fully Associative Randomized Cache



Large lookup increases power consumption and latency




Smaller lookup improves latency



How to get Security of Fully-Associative Design with Set-Associative Lookups?

Need to lookup the entire cache




Fully associative
Randomized LLC




Set Associative LLC



Fully associative caches improve security but at the cost of power and latency



MIRAGE [USENIX SECURITY '20]




MIRAGE Security




Security can be achieved by using extra invalid tag-ways


MIRAGE Tradeoffs



- (+) Provides complete security against conflict-based attacks
- (+) Performance comparable to a non-secure baseline
- (-) High storage and area overheads (>20%)
- (-) High power overheads (19%)




Motivation




>80% dead blocks in the LLC

Motivation




Can we reduce the data store size?



>80% dead blocks in the LLC

Motivation




Can we reduce the data store size?

But won't that hurt performance?




>80% dead blocks in the LLC



Tracking Reuse [MICRO '13]



Tag Store





Tracking Reuse [MICRO '13]




Tag Miss \Rightarrow Only tag is inserted

Tracking Reuse [MICRO '13]



Tag Hit, Data Miss \Rightarrow Data is brought in

Data is stored only when reuse is detected




Smaller data store and Reuse


MIRAGE

>20% storage overhead

Tag Store




Data Store




MAYA

2% storage savings


Tag Store



Data Store





Data entry requires 8X the number of bits compared to a tag entry




Maya Cache Design


More tag store entries but fewer data store entries






Security Model









Security Model




Security of Maya





Security of Maya



No set-associative eviction in 10^{16} years!



Security of Maya



No collision in 10^{16} years!


Can reuse be exploited?

Pr[Collision]

Number of valid entries in a set (N)



Exploiting Reuse




Maya uses Domain IDs for each tag entry

This isolates the reuse pattern of each domain

Therefore, Maya prevents any reuse-dependent fill-based attack

Exploiting Reuse




Maya uses Domain IDs for each tag entry

Tag for each domain


What about shared
memory attacks?


Address-dependent fill-





Shared memory attacks






Shared memory attacks

Two copies of the


Usage of Domain IDs mitigates shared memory attacks




Evaluation



Simulator	ChampSim Multicore Simulator
CPU	8-core OoO
L1/L2C	Private L1/L2 Caches
Baseline LLC	Shared, 16MB data store, 24 cycles
Maya LLC	Shared, 12MB data store, 28 cycles
Benchmarks	42 SPEC2017 traces, 20 GAP traces
Instructions	200M warmup, 200M simulation




Performance Results




Marginal performance improvement over a non-secure baseline

The game of tradeoffs (win-win)



Performance	~2% improvement
Storage	2% savings
Area	28% savings
Read Energy	15% savings
Write Energy	11% savings
Leakage Power	5% savings
Security?	Yes :)

Summary



Maya is a randomized fully associative last-level cache that uses additional tag entries and fewer data entries

Uses a reuse-based insertion policy

It guarantees no set-associative evictions in 10^{16} years

Maya provides a sweet spot in terms of security, performance, area and energy requirements

Thank You!



Artifact

